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Reputation and Accountability Relationships: Managing Accountability 
Expectations through Reputation 
 
 
 
Cassio: Reputation, reputation, reputation. Oh, I have lost my reputation.  
I have lost the immortal part of myself, and what remains is bestial […]  
Iago: […] Reputation is an idle and most false imposition, often got without merit 
and lost without deserving. […]  
(Othello, Act 2, Scene 3) 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Accountability is said to be about the management of expectations. Empirical studies 
reveal considerable variation in organizational interest, intensity and investment in 
accountability relationships. Less is known, however, as to what explains these 
observed variations. Drawing on accountability and reputation-concerned 
literatures, this paper argues that a reputation-based perspective to accountability 
offers an underlying logic that explains how account-giving actors and account-
holding forums actually manage these expectations, how organizations make sense of 
and prioritize among accountability responsibilities. Reputational considerations act 
as a filtering mechanism of external demands and help account for variations in 
degrees of interest in, and intensity of, accountability. The resulting accountability 
outcomes are co-produced by the reputational investment of both account-giver and 
account-holder, resulting in distinct accountability constellations and outcomes.  
 
 
Practitioner Points 
 
 Reputational concerns drive the way in which account-givers and account-holders 
relate to each other 
 Contingent on external audience perceptions, reputational concerns can 
disproportionately focus organisational attention on visible, controversial or 
politicised aspects 
 Public interest risks becoming narrowed down to the pursuit of salience for account-
givers and account-holders alike  
 Deficits arise when “what matters” for organizations (be they account-holders and 
account-givers) is not aligned with "what matters” from a public interest perspective 
 No “ideal” accountability design exists that does not generate “desired” and 
“undesired” behaviors  
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Organizations are facing mounting accountability expectations. Dubnick, for 
example, notes that accountability is often cited as “both the cause and the cure for 
every ailment and imperfection in government” (Dubnick 2011, 707; Dubnick and 
Fredrickson 2011). Resulting demand overloads, conflicting expectations, “multiple 
accountabilities disorders” and such pathologies are widely diagnosed (Koppel 2005; 
Dubnick 2005; Bevan and Hood 2006; Hood 2007; Bovens et al. 2008; Messner 2009; 
Flinders 2011). Accountability is said to be about “the management of expectations” 
(Romzek and Dubnick 1987); but how do public organizations actually manage the 
diverse expectations and demands placed on them by different audiences? 
 
Empirical studies reveal considerable variation in organizational interest, intensity 
and investment in accountability relationships –on both the part of account-givers 
and account-holders. For instance, the literature on political accountability points at 
variation in account-holders’ involvement and interest ranging from high intensity to 
largely ineffectual account-holding activities characterised by “undersight” (Zegart, 
1999; 2011) and “passive principals” (Brandsma 2013). Similarly, whereas a whole 
host of studies speak of runaway agents, another strain highlights the pro-active 
nature of account-giving by non-ministerial agencies (Reiss 2011; Puppis et al. 2014 
Koop 2014).  
 
While we have a large variety of accountability typologies and diagnoses, less is 
known as to what explains differences in actual investment in accountability 
relationships. What is the underlying organizational logic that drives the observed 
variation in accountability relationships? Furthermore, what are the effects of these 
dynamics in terms of resulting accountability regimes? To account for these 
differences, this article suggests that (i) accountability behavior has to be understood 
as being motivated by reputational concerns, and (ii) accountability is an 
interdependent relationship between account-holders and account-givers.  We argue 
that a reputation-based perspective to accountability offers an underlying logic of 
how account-giving actors and account-holding forums actually manage these 
expectations, how organizations make sense of and prioritize among the seemingly 
endless plethora of accountability responsibilities.  
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Organizational attention— of both account-holding forums and principals as well as 
of account-giving actors— is limited. Reputational considerations act as a filtering 
mechanism of external demands and help account for variations in degrees of 
interest in, and intensity of, accountability processes. They drive the focus and 
attention bestowed by organizations. The resulting accountability outcomes are co-
produced by the reputational investment of both account-giver and account-holder. 
In other words, reputation is an important driver of the accountability behavior of 
account-givers and account-holders, resulting in distinct accountability constellations 
and outcomes. We adopt a relational approach as we identify the accountability 
outcomes that are jointly produced in the interaction. In doing so, we aim to 
contribute to both accountability and reputation-concerned literatures which both 
are centrally about moments of exchange and interaction. 
 
Much of the recent empirical work on reputation has focused on how organizational 
actors selectively respond to external criticism. Yet, the actor’s account cannot 
succeed without being ‘heard’ or received by the audience. An exclusive focus on 
how actors react to audience criticism, in the absence of an understanding of the role 
of the audience, conveys only a partial and a necessarily limited understanding of 
reputational processes. It is therefore necessary to consider both the account-giver 
and the account-holder; both the actor and its audience. As co-production is a key 
characteristic of both accountability and reputation, the study of the interaction 
needs to be at the centre of the analysis. 
 
A reputation-based perspective points to those areas where one can expect to see 
enhanced levels of intensity and investments in accountability relationships, or on 
the contrary, a disregard for accountability processes. Formal structures provide for 
the formal expectations (and associated incentives) placed upon organizations. 
However, they cannot fully account for the varied ways in which organizations 
choose to assign focus and attention among the various formal and informal 
expectations placed upon them, where we will see neglect of formal obligations or to 
the contrary, an intensification thereof. By stressing the reputational concerns that 
characterize organizational behavior, this approach advances our understanding of 
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how accountability processes unfold beyond the study of formal structures and 
incentives. 
 
The rest of this article explores this argument in three steps. First, it deepens the 
discussion regarding the relationship between accountability and reputation. Second, 
it highlights how organizational interests can be differentiated in terms of their 
reputational investment. Third, it develops a typology of accountability 
constellations and outcomes based on variations in account-giver and account-holder 
reputational investment in the accountability relationship. We draw on a variety of 
empirical examples from the literature to illustrate our main points. 
 
Accountability and Reputation  
Both the exercise of accountability and concerns with reputation are relational: they 
refer to the relationship or the interaction between the account-giving actor and the 
account-holding forum (Bovens 2007; Dubnick and Fredrickson 2010). Bovens, for 
instance, defines accountability as ‘a relationship between an actor and a forum in 
which the actor is obliged to explain and justify his conduct; the forum can pose 
questions; pass judgment; and the actor may face consequences’ (Bovens 2007, 452).  
 
The reputational concerns of both account-givers and account-holders are at the 
heart of this perspective to public accountability. More generally, reputation has 
been identified as being crucial for understanding individual and organizational 
behavior (Carpenter 2001; 2010; Moffitt 2010, 2014; Carpenter and Krause 2012; Gilad 
2015; Maor 2015; Busuioc 2016). We argue that reputational concerns are central to 
account-giving and account-holding as well. Thus, reputation accounts for a pro-
active sense of engaging “networks of audiences” or different degrees of 
responsiveness to critical or supportive signals from these audiences. Account-
holding or -giving are essential parts of cultivating one’s reputation vis-à-vis the 
respective account-giver or –holder as well as multiple audiences. Seen from a 
reputational perspective, accountability is not about reducing “information 
asymmetry”, moral duties, containing agency losses, or ensuring that agents stay 
committed to the original terms of their mandate. Instead, accountability – in terms 
of holding and giving – is about advancing one’s own reputation vis-à-vis different 
audiences— for account-givers and account-holders alike. Reputational concerns 
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determine which account-holders matter for account-giving actors (and should 
therefore be prioritized) among the thicket of existing relationships, and which 
competencies will be emphasized in the account-giving process. Similarly, for 
account-holders, reputational concerns help determine which of their account-givers 
will be prioritized and become the focus of limited organizational energy and 
resources. 
 
This account differs from much of the literature on accountability that does not 
examine the two parties—account-giver and account-holder or actor and forum—
jointly. The focus has largely been on whether, and if so how, actors/account-givers 
carry out their account-giving duties. Account-holders/forums however, are largely 
taken for granted, assumed by default to be discharging their end of the relationship 
in practice (e.g. posing questions, passing judgment, enacting consequences).  
 
Displaying similar one-sidedness, the principal-agent literature on bureaucracy is 
primarily concerned with formal control strategies employed by principals, in 
abstract of agent responses and behavior. Orthodox principal-agent based accounts 
would account for differences in the intensity of oversight by pointing to transaction 
costs. Within this framework, principals’ monitoring efforts are the result of a 
calculated trade-off between monitoring costs and informational (and electoral) 
benefits. Principals will, for instance, choose between resource-intensive “police 
patrolling” and less costly (yet dependent on third parties) “fire alarms” (McCubbins 
and Schwartz, 1984), or even dispense with providing for monitoring mechanisms 
altogether. Focusing on “principal supremacy” (Meier and Krause 2003, 301; or 
“principal authority”, Carpenter and Krause 2015) in the relationship, such 
approaches often ignore the co-produced nature of accountability interactions and 
the relevance of agent preferences in shaping principal responses (see however, 
Callander 2008; Gailmard and Patty 2007, 2013), the control process, and actual 
oversight outcomes. 
 
How, then, can such reputational concerns be understood? Reputation relates to the 
“presentation of self” (to make the inevitable reference to Goffmann 1959). 
Organizations, just as individuals, seek support and acceptance from their networks 
of audiences (Romzek et al. 2012), driven to a considerable extent by an “audience 
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approval motive” and “concerns with falling in the esteem of others” (Tetlock 2002, 
455, reflecting (Tetlock’s) “intuitive politician” framework). Whereas such analysis 
has often been used to account for individual behavior, similar claims can easily be 
made, and have been made, for individuals within organizations and organizations 
as a whole (Carpenter 2001; 2010). Behavioral accounts of (public) bureaucracy have 
noted how organizations strive towards niches that are not populated by potential 
rivals, that are generally popular and unlikely to generate negative headlines and 
political attention, and that do not require co-production (Wilson 1989). After all, 
receiving criticism from relevant audiences, the drumbeat of increasing attacks in 
view of ongoing “failure” or, arguably more importantly, the perception of not 
appropriately fulfilling one’s own role perception are potentially highly 
destabilizing.  
 
Following Carpenter (2010), one can distinguish four key sources that define 
organizational core competencies. It is in these areas that we expect organizations to 
invest in reputation management (“reputational investment”). We understand “core 
competency” here in terms of organizational identity (‘what do we want to be known 
for’). These four competencies are technical, procedural, performative and moral. 
Technical defines subject expertise, procedural the capacity to follow procedures and 
justify decisions on that basis, performative points to the appearance of successful 
outcomes, and moral to a general acknowledgement of the inherent worthiness of 
the organization’s activities.  
 
An organizational “nirvana” in terms of reputation would be to be well-regarded on 
all four of these dimensions, but it is unlikely that such a constellation will emerge 
that easily. After all, not all organizational decision-making can be measured or 
directly attributed (therefore reducing the possibility of performance-based 
reputation), procedural accuracy may be disputed if outcomes are seen to violate 
appropriate “morals” or appear unsuccessful in performance terms, and what 
constitutes “technical expertise” is often also contested. Furthermore, the context of 
executive politics hinders organizations’ pursuit of reputational niche-seeking. After 
all, political careers depend on the rise and fall of (competing) bureaucratic 
organizations, interdependencies persist across government, public sector activities 
are likely to generate political heat, and, therefore, organisational/individual 
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survival cannot be taken for granted (even if organisational “death” is rarely 
diagnosed) (see also Bertelli et al. 2015, Bertelli and Sinclair 2015). Organizations, 
therefore, select strategies as to how they seek to be understood and stress particular 
aspects of their competence to enhance audience perceptions of niche roles, 
uniqueness and appropriateness. 
 
How these resources play into the way in which organizations give and hold to 
account varies on the basis of which they can draw on these resources. In giving 
account and holding to account, organizations will stress those competencies that 
allow them to present themselves in a positive light to specific audiences so as to 
enhance beliefs about one’s unique role and competence: Account-holding becomes 
an opportunity to demonstrate competence and responsiveness. For a regulator, for 
instance, a complaint against a certain party is “a chance for public relations work, an 
opportunity (…) to demonstrate its worth making the source of the complaint a 
significant matter” (Hawkins 1984, 97). Similarly, account-giving places actors in a 
limelight and affords them the opportunity to highlight specific competences and 
aspects of performance. As organizations, both account-holders and account-givers 
will be driven by reputational considerations with self-presentation, esteem and the 
projection of competence “where it matters” when enacting their accountability roles. 
 
Such a perspective leads to two further implications. One is that any relationship 
between account-giver and account-holder is embedded in a much wider set of 
“networks of audiences” (Carpenter 2010). Audiences can be both formal and 
informal in nature (i.e. outside the formal chain of authority) and play a key role in 
empowering or weakening an organization (Carpenter 2010). Organizations may 
select strategies as to how they seek to be understood, but, ultimately, reputation 
emerges as a product of the way in which audiences respond to these attempts at 
self-presentation. Such attempts put considerable strain on the account-giver: the 
external view confirms and mirrors the image that organizations seek to display. 
Account-giving will always be about anticipating the reactions of these networks of 
audiences (see Tetlock 2002). Furthermore, the accountability of account-givers is 
inherently limited, not all decision-making can easily be accounted for, the 
expectation of having to give account may overshadow attention to the actual 
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practice, and social norms shape the style and scope of account-giving (see Messner 
2009). 
 
Accordingly, the way organizations give account does not solely relate to the party to 
whom account is given. Equally, reputations of account-holders are not solely 
dependent on the relationship with the account-giver. Instead, the way in which 
accountability relationships play out is that the two parties are concerned about their 
reputation in view of wider networks of audiences that will value the activities of the 
account-giver and -holder on the way accountability is being exercised. Put 
differently, it is the reputational consequences of giving and holding to account in 
view of the wider networks of audiences that accounts for the variations in efforts 
among account-givers and account-holders. 
 
The other implication is that account-holder and account-giver are in an 
interdependent relationship in which accountability (i.e. the result of account-giving 
and -holding) is co-produced. Account-holders will be criticized for their 
performance if account-givers are found wanting. For example, those holding 
financial institutions to account did not escape criticism for having failed to notice 
increasing vulnerabilities in financial markets before the full scale of the global 
economic crisis were being realized. As a result, any attempt at self-presentation will 
not just be evaluated on the basis of the performance itself, but on the basis of the 
performance of other parties. Reputations can be made and unmade by the 
performance of others. 
 
In sum, by taking a reputational approach to accountability, a new set of actors (i.e., 
audiences) is introduced into the principal-agent (actor-forum) oversight equation, 
thereby altering established dynamics. From a reputational perspective, agents and 
principals (as well as other types of account-holders, namely ’forums’ in 
accountability terminology such as third-party monitors) are organizations, have 
audiences and are dependent upon them for their support and endorsement. While 
the existing literature would suggest that the two accountability parties are driven by 
different interests—political account-holders by re-election motives, administrative 
account-givers by concerns of bureaucratic politics— we put forward a unified logic 
of action in accountability.  
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This argument challenges many of the key assumptions of “principal supremacy” 
that characterize principal-agent based approaches to accountability. Principals, as 
well as other account-holders, driven by reputational considerations, interact with 
agents (account-givers) in ways that go beyond a sole interest in the prevention of 
“drift” or “shirking” or the containment of “agency losses”. Instead, the principal 
becomes potentially dependent on the agent for the endorsement of, and compliance 
with, its role: agency reluctance to do so will reflect negatively on the reputation of 
the principal vis-à-vis its audiences. Moreover, the agent can build “coalitions of 
esteem” among various audiences, which can empower it vis-à-vis its principal (as 
noted by Carpenter 2001; Moffitt 2010). Certain control mechanisms or courses of 
action (e.g. the use of formal sanctions, organizational termination), while formally 
available, can become reputationally barred as a result, challenging notions of 
“principal hegemony” in the relationship. For example, seeking to intensively hold 
“trustee”-type organizations to account may face resistance: demanding greater 
accountability from supposedly independent central banks or economic regulators 
(or courts) may face criticism on the basis that such attempts reduce “credibility” and 
amount to “politicization”. These audience-induced dynamics question the hierarchy 
formally assumed in orthodox principal-agent perspectives; from a reputational 
approach, the account-giver account-holder interaction becomes one characterized 
by complex interdependencies.  
 
A reputational approach therefore offers a distinct theoretical account of 
organizational behaviour in accountability relationships. By identifying reputation as 
a key variable in driving accountability behaviour and outcomes, the approach 
stands apart from established approaches in the accountability literature, which are 
largely descriptive/analytical, or evaluative in nature (Bovens 2007; Bovens, 
Schillemans, ‘t Hart 2008). Moreover, due to its emphasis on reputation as the source 
of bureaucratic power (as opposed to informational asymmetries), actor-forum 
interdependence (as opposed to ‘principal supremacy’), and the crucial role of 
informal relationships and interactions (as opposed to formal structures), it also 
offers a different account to predictive principal-agent informed approaches to 
accountability.  
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The next section expands on the notion of reputational investment before moving to 
a discussion of the consequences of a reputation-based account in terms of 
accountability constellations. 
 
Reputational Investment in Account-giving and Account-holding 
 
How, then, does an emphasis on reputation bring us closer to making sense of how 
organizations manage accountability expectations? How does reputation supposedly 
regulate organizational investment in accountability? 
 
As reputation is central to organizational and individual life, it determines the ways 
in which individuals seek to allocate attention, and blame. Given that at the heart of 
reputation management is the protection of one’s reputation, a higher intensity of 
both account-giving and account-holding will occur in areas of higher reputational 
investment, i.e., where it matters whether one’s reputation is being 
maintained/enhanced or not. In other words, reputational investment matters in 
accounting for different degrees of intensity and interest in giving and holding to 
account. Below we distinguish between “core” and “non-core” reputational concerns 
of both account-giver and account-holder, and, in a second step, we explore how 
variations in these concerns lead to the emergence of different kinds of accountability 
dynamics between the two parties.  
 
Turning to the account-giver first, the empirical literature on accountability, as 
mentioned, has illustrated considerable variation in account-giving. Account-givers 
are not just seeking to “drift”, instead numerous instances of voluntary and pro-
active account-giving have been identified, even if such activities come with 
significant opportunity costs (Reiss 2011; Koop 2014; Karsten 2015). Such enthusiasm 
(or reluctance) can be explained by an actor’s assumptions about the reputational 
implications of behaving in a certain way. Thus, some relationships warrant greater 
organizational attention than others. After all, while account-givers are said to be 
aware of their diverse audiences, not all audiences have the same potential effect on 
the perception of the account-giver’s performance, and, therefore, on their likely 
survival (Carpenter and Krause 2012). 
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Account-giving allows organizations to garner support, to interact and track 
audience expectations, manage perceptions (and reputational risk) as well as to 
present themselves to (and court) new audiences. Accordingly, for account-givers, 
more intensive accountability behavior will take place on aspects related to core 
competencies – as this is where reputational costs (and potential gains) are 
concentrated –and/or in response to other heightened reputational threats, such as 
due to recurrent criticism, moments of high political controversy or salience. 
“Uneven responsiveness” (Maor 2015) is therefore a consequence of whether 
account-giving occurs in an area of “non-core” or “core” interest and heightened 
reputational risk. In this respect, Moffitt (2010, also 2014: chapter 5), for example, 
highlights how the FDA utilizes public advisory committees to re-apportion 
responsibility for high-risk tasks by publicizing risk and uncertainty, especially when 
these risks relate to implementation-related activities conducted by actors outside the 
agency itself. Public committees become venues for deliberately revealing 
information to shape outsider knowledge and perceptions and manage reputational 
risk related to high implementation uncertainty. Regulators in other settings have 
also increasingly been reported to pro-actively set up public hearings and organize 
public consultations (Löfstedt and Bouder 2014) and to pro-actively communicate to 
justify their actions (Puppis et al. 2014). “Fishbowl transparency” (Coglianese 2009), 
the pro-active release of uncontextualised data is becoming increasingly popular 
among regulators in an attempt to build public trust, particularly in response to 
regulatory scandals and incidents (Löfstedt and Way 2014). Such efforts are 
increasingly visible among European Union (EU) regulators and range from the 
release of (raw) safety data including clinical trial reports (e.g. European Medicines 
Agency) to pro-active public overviews of regulatory interactions with the industry 
(e.g. the European Banking Authority) or public consultations on an unprecedented 
opening up of the scientific process, including allowing for unsolicited input in all 
phases of the internal decision-making process (e.g. European Food Safety Authority, 
‘Open EFSA’ initiative).  
 
Carpenter’s four core resources for reputation identify those key aspects in which 
organizations respond with higher degrees of attention towards their audiences’ 
signals. Such higher levels of intensity can be expressed in both pro-active and 
highly defensive strategies that highlight the technical, procedural, performative or 
 12 
moral importance of their work. Such presentational strategies will not necessarily 
only result in the production of ‘more’ information and account-giving or hardened 
‘teflon’ defences, but will emerge as a careful calculation of potential risks. In other 
words, organizations will stress their moral status (as guardian of particular societal 
values and own organizational status as ‘trustee’; for example, as ‘guardian of the 
social market economy’ in the case of the German federal cartel authority or as 
‘protection from communist subversive activities’ in the case of Hoover’s FBI), their 
performative success (such as ‘having reduced prices to customers’ or ‘secured 
private investment’, as often provided by UK-based economic regulators), their 
procedural appropriateness (such as health rationing agencies seeking to defend why 
some patients are deemed unworthy of supposedly too costly treatment), or their 
technical expertise (such as organizations stressing their high degree of professional 
qualification).  
 
In contrast, in areas of low reputational investment (non–core interest), there will be 
less interest in providing information and in account-giving. These are areas where 
survival is not at stake, so information will be provided at a minimum level and the 
likely response is low-level protocolization. Varying levels of organizational 
responsiveness to external criticism are documented in practice and this 
differentiated responsiveness is found to be shaped by reputational considerations, 
i.e. by an organization’s understanding of its core reputation and associated 
reputational threats (Carpenter 2001; Maor et al. 2013; Gilad et al. 2013). 
 
A distinction in core and non-core significance for account-givers’ reputation may be 
accused of being overly simplistic. Core interests may be difficult to identify as any 
one organization may be said to consist of different incentives and professional 
orientations. Organizations may face problems in terms of internal dynamics when it 
comes to identifying core and non-core areas for reputation management. For 
example, university academics are usually less interested in accounting for teaching-
related activities (i.e. non-core activities):  teaching, unlike research, is not seen as 
being of equal value in terms of professional reputation (as evidenced by the 
inevitable conference circuit question ‘what are you working on’). In contrast, 
university management, faced with the institutional reputational costs of poor 
rankings and consequent potential loss in student-related income, may regard 
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accounting for teaching quality as core activity. Such internal processes are at the 
heart of many internal organizational battles and shape the ways in which 
organizations are able to pursue proactive and defensive ways of protecting their 
reputation. Indeed, the argument presented here therefore also holds for 
accountability relationships within organizations rather than merely between 
different organizations. However, such internal tensions just add a further layer to 
the reputational argument, namely the way in which actors can engage in reputation 
management and are perceived to be doing so in a credible way by their audiences. 
 
For account-holders, reputational investment similarly matters in accounting for 
different degrees of intensity and interest in holding to account. Whether 
accountability forums ‘care’ about accountability, and therefore maintain an interest 
in discharging their formal duties, is dependent on the extent to which such activities 
are of core significance to their reputation. Whereas much of the existing literature 
assumes that account-holders are, by default, interested in holding agents to account, 
this assumption does not match empirical observations. Not all account-holding 
settings are populated by organizations with a vested interest in the performance of 
the account-giving entity. Forum interest in accountability is found wanting in a 
variety of settings—whether the setting is domestic agencies/ministerial 
departments (Dudley 1994; Hogwood et al. 2000; Schillemans 2011; Pollitt 2006; 
Dubnick and Frederickson 2010) or supranational/EU-level ones (Brandsma 2013; 
Busuioc 2013). For instance, Ogul (1976, 177) found that reports sent by the executive 
branch to Congress were mostly not read with a legislator noting: “we have to keep 
the wastebaskets full to survive.”  So-called “forum drift” (Busuioc 2013; Schillemans 
and Busuioc 2015) ranges from poor preparation for accountability moments and 
lack of engagement with the actor, to altogether being absent at hearings and the 
absence of sanctions despite documented agent non-compliance. 
 
As with account-givers, account-holder’s reputational costs (and gains) are 
heightened when core competences are at stake. For some account-holders/forums, 
accountability is more of defining function of their identity than for others. Audit 
offices, administrative tribunals, ombudsmen are “institutions of accountability” for 
which accountability is a primary, defining competence, whereas for other account-
holders such as legislatures, it is only one of several functions (Mulgan 2000). We 
 14 
expect more intensive account-holding among forums where accountability is a core 
task for account-holders as opposed to an incidental/secondary one. There will be 
severe (negative) reputational consequences for those who are being seen to be 
‘slacking’ on the job of holding to account when this is a defining organizational role.  
 
In contrast, for those organizations where account-holding is a secondary task and 
not central to their reputation, failure to invest in account-holding is unlikely to lead 
to significant reputational gains or losses. This is consistent with the often limited 
and sporadic interest in accountability processes among political actors that has been 
documented in a variety of accountability studies (Dudley 1994; Hogwood et al. 
2000; Mulgan 2003; Pollitt 2006; Verhoest et al. 2010). Research on UK agencies noted 
that “[p]arliamentary and ministerial interest” varied “from the persistently 
uninterested, through minor levels of the irritatingly irrelevant (as seen by agency), 
through varying levels (sometimes seen as useful feedback), to very high levels in a 
small number of agencies (…)” (Hogwood et al. 2000, 221).  
 
Nevertheless, even secondary tasks carry a potential for reputational risk when they 
gain public visibility. It follows then that account-holders—including partial ones— 
much like their account-givers, pay attention to issues that carry the potential of 
increased reputational risk (other than core competences) due to increased salience 
or heightened controversy and ensuing visibility. Such specific instances also offer 
the opportunity to cast the organization as an active and diligent account-holder. 
Empirically, increased salience is associated with increases in oversight and this 
applies to forums otherwise seen as neglecting their account-holding processes (e.g. 
Dudley 1994; Zegart 1999; Hogwood et al. 2000; Pollitt 2006). For instance, in her 
study of US intelligence agencies, Zegart speaks of legislators with weak incentives 
to oversee such agencies, exercising sporadic and ineffectual oversight. When they 
did exercise “bouts” of oversight, legislators focused on press reports and very 
visible intelligence abuses (e.g. such as CIA’s secret operations), as opposed to less 
glamorous, yet endemic, co-ordination problems: “With the camera lights on, 
Congress’s attention naturally gravitated to covert activities (…) Scandalous spy 
schemes make for sexy work and great publicity. Legislators who investigated press 
reports of clandestine abuses were considered ‘players’. They appeared important, at 
the center of action—and this appearance appealed to voters. (…) Focusing on more 
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nitty gritty organizational issues instead of Orwellian specters offered no such 
political rewards” (Zegart 1999, 197).  
 
This relevance of public visibility to oversight behavior is raised by a number of 
other studies. Ogul (1976, 15) for instance, notes how visibility (“to groups that are 
important to them”) serves as a stimulus for Congressional oversight. In his study of 
water pollution control, Hawkins (1984, 97) notes how “[a]gency vulnerability to 
public criticism leads them to be more responsive to complaints raised by those in a 
position of power.” In fact, control mandates were redefined on this basis: “for many 
fieldmen, the working definition of a ‘serious’ pollution is ‘basically anything that’s 
going to cause a great amount of public reaction’” (also Etienne 2015). Public 
visibility, in its various guises, shapes the oversight behavior of account-holders in 
fundamental ways. 
 
From this perspective, it might be argued that “ownership” (i.e., being a principal as 
opposed to a third-party account-holder or monitor) matters. However, the effect is 
an indirect one: it does so by constituting a reputational investment in accountability. 
In other words, principals might not necessarily be invested in accountability and 
control processes through (prior) ownership but through reputation. If a 
bureaucratic actor “misbehaves”, this is likely to reflect badly reputationally and 
have a backlash at the political level for the principal. For instance, while a certain 
task might have been delegated to an independent body, such formal separation will 
make little difference in the case of high profile scandals. The political principal is 
likely to have to suffer the consequences on a par with the agent. The anticipation of 
such potential reputational repercussions and the desire to pre-empt them is an 
important incentive— and possibly a more plausible explanation— for a principal 
interest in (aspects of) agency control post-delegation.  
 
One implication is that we need to focus on the interactions between account-giver 
and account-holder (and the wider networks of audiences) rather than on one side of 
the relationship only. If the “other” is of high importance to one’s reputation, then 
support (or lack of criticism) is essential. Therefore, the extent to which the “other” 
(account-giver or –holder) is important for contributing to one’s reputation in the 
face of one’s audiences matters. It matters for both the intensity of interest in giving 
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or holding to account, as well as the ways in which these different degrees of interest 
are channeled (Power et al. 2009). High degrees of interest are likely to lead to a 
decrease in informal “high trust” relationships and therefore trigger formalization 
and codification. 
 
Accountability, Reputation and Interaction 
So far we have dealt with the two actors separately and have focused solely on issues 
of motivation based on the centrality of the account-giving or account-holding to an 
organization’s reputation. Accountability is, however, as noted, relational. It matters 
what the supposed understandings over the respective duties and entitlements are. 
For example, agency-type relationships might be said to differ considerably from 
those defined as “trustee”-type relationships (Majone 2001; Hood and Lodge 2006). 
Account-givers are likely to pay considerable attention to their status; for example, 
whether they understand their role as being that of a “subordinate agency” or as 
autonomously “standing apart” from other organizations in a trustee-type 
arrangement.  
 
In turn, whether account-holders will pay much attention to such understandings 
during times of heightened attention is questionable, and whether they will respect 
institutional boundaries will largely depend on the potential reputational costs of 
doing so. Reputation-based accounts also highlight that perceptions of “trustees” and 
“agents” can vary over time, regardless of legal framework. Establishing or 
maintaining understandings regarding trustee- and agent-roles is central to an 
individual’s and an organization’s reputation and, thus, at the heart of account-
giving and account-holding. Furthermore, demands for “account-giving” and 
“accountability”-supplying also raise issues about direction of interest. Establishing 
reputation in terms of performing a particular role expectation establishes particular 
incentives to ask for, or supply some types of information rather than others.  
 
Drawing on the earlier distinction between “core” and “non-core” concerns among 
account-holders and account-givers, four distinct relational outcomes and dynamics 
of accountability relationships can be distinguished. These are illustrated in Table 1. 
The rest of this section explores the dynamics in more detail, but four key 
implications of this 2x2 table should be noted. One is that the relational focus 
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emphasizes the importance of accountability processes as a co-production resulting 
from the degree of reputational investment by both account-giver and account-
holder.  The second is that these activities have, in turn, effects on the respective 
parties’ relationships with their networks of audiences. The third is that the 
discussion moves beyond the traditional concern with drift by being able to 
incorporate further constellations. The fourth, resultant, implication is that none of 
these constellations should be seen as more or less desirable and, as noted, changes 
in public attention can lead to shifts from one cell to another. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Intensive heat. Under conditions of mutual high interest, i.e. where account-giver 
and -holder both have a core interest in the relationship and are reputationally-
invested in accountability, we expect “intensive heat”. Parliamentary grillings of 
agencies and industry actors following scandals (such as congressional hearings of 
regulators and top bankers during the financial crisis, or following high-profile 
intelligence leaks), commissions of inquiry, hearings of new EU commissioners 
before the European Parliament are illustrations of such dynamics. Account-givers 
will be concerned about presenting their activities in the most positive light, by 
opting for presentational strategies that highlight achievements, by developing 
defensive blame management strategies against potential areas of attack, and by 
gaming in order to massage performance management systems to escape criticism 
and offer “good news”. Intensive activity on the part of the actor is not just directed 
in supplying information; intensive activity can also be directed towards exhaustive 
denials or the purposeful non-disclosure of damaging information.  
 
In turn, account-holders will be actively discharging their tasks, going beyond 
mandated responsibilities and developing visible strategies of holding to account. 
Such activities offer them the opportunity to establish their profile as reputable 
account-holders. This will include visible target-setting, at times high (-profile) 
demands for actors to give account, and attempts at establishing a reputation for 
high level interest in, if not knowledge, of the field. For example, in the context of 
political account-holders, it is likely that such core interests will be focused on 
headline-grabbing and politically useful aspects. Emphasis will be placed on the 
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“measureable”. Other type of account-holders may have different time-horizons, but 
they will be concerned with cultivating a reputation as competent, and even pro-
active, account-holders. Given the intensity of the interaction between account-givers 
and account-holders and the high reputational stakes, this is unlikely to lead to a 
willingness to be exposed to potentially embarrassing or career-harming 
information. In sum, therefore, what characterizes this relationship dynamic is that 
accountability processes carry high stakes for both parties. The outcome is likely to 
be volatile relationships with varying types of standards, repeated calls for a 
“codification” of relationships and inevitable blame games.  
 
Going through the motions. Under conditions in which account-holders’ core 
interest is in holding to account (be it because accountability is a core task or because 
the account-giver is salient/controversial), but where the account-giver has little 
interest in establishing or sustaining their reputation via this particular relationship 
or mechanism, we expect a pattern of “going through the motions”. Account-holders 
will demand information and will seek to establish their profile in order to build 
their reputation. Different types of forums will be interested in different types of 
information, whether this is in presentational headlines, financial accounts, or 
operational protocols. This will be met by relative passive account-giving that will 
provide for a minimum level of compliance so as not to alienate the forum, without 
much concern about the reputational consequences of giving account in this 
particular relationship. This is an area where protocolization and the presence of 
guidelines will be used as evidence of procedural compliance.  
 
Account-givers, for their part, are unlikely to be able to resist demands for account-
giving over time; however, one would expect that such responses will remain at a 
minimum level. Indeed, they may turn on aggressive account-holding by 
complaining about administrative burdens and goal displacement. Audits could at 
times fall into this category. Characterized as “the dead end of accountability”, 
audits are often produced for their “rubber-stamping” function, but they are not 
engaged with further by regulatory agencies or political actors (Power 1999).  
 
Unsolicited advances. Under conditions of non-core interest by account-holders, but 
core interest and reputational investment by account-givers, we expect a pattern to 
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emerge that can be defined as “unsolicited advances”. Such a pattern suggests that 
the account-giver will voluntarily provide for additional sources of information and 
reporting, pro-actively attempt to engage the forum and manage expectations or to 
build additional constituencies of support by initiating procedures vis-à-vis other 
account-holders in order to establish and maintain their reputation. What 
characterizes this category is the one-sided, non-requited, voluntary character of the 
interaction, with a forthcoming account-giver and relative disinterested passivity on 
the side of the account-holder. For example, such a dynamic could be said to support 
the development of “voluntary accountability” (Schillemans 2011; Koop 2014; 
Karsten 2015), i.e., practices initiated by the actor that go beyond formal 
requirements. Standards of accountability implicit in voluntary regulation 
mechanisms and certification procedures, for instance, could be another illustration 
of such unilateral attempts aimed at cultivating a positive organizational image and 
expanding one’s support basis (Tremblay-Boire et al. 2016).  A whole range of 
organizations have taken to indicating their commitment towards environmental, 
social or other “good citizenship” activities, without any form of major interest by a 
specific forum. 
 
This account therefore offers an alternative to the conventional explanation for the 
presence of voluntary accountability as a pre-emptive strategy to prevent more 
extraneous formal accountability provisions, instead, voluntary accountability 
emerges as a strategy to build audience support and to cultivate a positive 
reputation. Consistent with this explanation, voluntary accountability practices that 
have been documented amongst a broad array of regulatory agencies are said to be 
primarily horizontal in nature i.e., they are geared towards actors outside the 
hierarchical or supervisory chain as attempts to broaden networks of support 
(Schillemans 2011), as opposed to traditional principals. “Unsolicited advances” can 
allow an organization to engage with new audiences and ‘cozy up’ to new sources of 
support, complementing existing (formal) network affiliations. As noted above, 
political interest in agency performance is found to be related to salience 
considerations; organizational bodies at the low end of the salience spectrum will 
have to seek approval and support elsewhere.  
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At the same time, it is likely that such voluntary accountability focused on those 
areas where organizations will perform “well”, and do not risk embarrassment. Such 
voluntary exercises emerge either as an attempt to force other parties to present 
similar information, or, indeed, as a response to reputation-driven “races to the top”.  
 
Parallel lives. Finally, a pattern of “parallel lives” emerges when both parties have 
no core interest in giving or holding to account. There will be minimum engagement 
in order to follow formal requirements and to ensure that this pattern of mutual non-
engagement does not have any reputationally damaging implications should things 
go wrong. However, in this case reputation will be built elsewhere in the sense that 
other audiences will be regarded as more important. Thus, in a political context, 
social or professional fora (or altogether different political fora) will be seen as more 
important for enhancing reputation on the side of account-givers, while account-
holders will be primarily interested in fostering their own careers rather than 
expending their energies on holding entities to account that will have no impact on 
their survival or advancement. Relationships will be largely informal and limited. 
The oversight dynamic between Congress and CIA referred to earlier provides a 
good illustration of this. According to Zegart: “For 27 years, Congress was content to 
avert its eyes (…) Even after the 1961 Bay of Pigs operation, legislators shied away 
from challenging or changing the CIA. Reaction was limited to a single set of 
hearings by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. (…) the tone of the meetings 
was friendly, even jovial. Bissell [the CIA Deputy Director] and the committee 
members exchanged pleasantries. Chairman Wayne Morse expressed some surprise 
at some of the support logistics, but left it at that. The CIA emerged without a scratch 
(…)” (Zegart 1999, 194).  
 
While each one of these accountability constellations and dynamics points to distinct 
reputational investments, this does not mean that these constellations are likely to 
remain stable. Accountability interactions can be located in different cells of the table. 
For instance, young or inexperienced agencies that seek support and recognition are 
likely to intensively court the favors of a large set of account-holders at once. With 
the passage of time, they are likely to learn which relationships matter reputationally 
and become settled in a less “gruelling” accountability pattern. 
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Environment and institutional disturbances are also likely to lead to changes in the 
ways in which audiences and aspects are assessed as core- or non-core 
reputationally. Moreover, organizations will not necessarily always get their 
reputational calculations right. For instance, in their classic study of the Challenger 
disaster, Romzek and Dubnick (1987) document how NASA shifted from a 
professional accountability system towards bureaucratic and political accountability, 
with tragic consequences. Similarly, the financial crisis offers a good example for 
changing costs and benefits to account-holders. In view of wider hostility towards 
financial institutions, legislative committees turned increasingly hostile towards 
financial institutions and their regulators. This, in turn, had implications for the way 
in which account-givers were seeking to sustain their reputation; both in pro-active 
and responsive ways. Finally, a further factor pointing to inherent instability in the 
accountability constellation and dynamic is the cost to both parties inherent in each 
of these fields. A relationship defined by “intensive heat” is highly demanding for 
both account-holder and account-giver, and is unlikely to persist over time.  
 
Conclusion  
A reputation-based account has a number of implications for the study of 
accountability. The epitaph from Shakespeare’s Othello highlights an important 
tension: on the one hand the key identity-shaping and relevance of reputation to 
organizational life (Cassio) and, on the other, a view as to the illusory character of 
reputation as a matter of perception and presentation, granted externally, often 
“without merit and lost without deserving” (Iago). While these two positions offer 
contrasting moral positions, their combined insights point to the importance of 
reputation in organizational life. This paper has sought to advance the literatures on 
accountability and reputation by emphasizing a relational account that focuses on 
the interaction of account-givers and account-holders. Alternative logics of action 
and different settings offer further scope to explore variations in accountability 
behavior (Mashaw 2006), but such discussion goes beyond the scope of this article. 
 
Four main implications emerge from our reputation-based argument. The adoption 
of one theoretical lens will necessarily bring its own biases, blind spots and 
limitations but, hopefully, come with gains in analytical rigor and coherence. First, 
the perspective advanced in this article moves beyond existing accounts by stressing 
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the fundamental importance of reputational considerations in shaping organizational 
behavior in accountability. Reputation is at the heart of organizational survival, 
shaping the way in which organizations selectively focus their activities and 
responses on some responsibilities more than others. It is part of organizations’ 
“immortal parts” and it is about external imposition. 
 
Second, this perspective highlights that giving and holding to account is about 
relationships and relational interdependence, not just between the account-giver and 
-holder, but also with wider networks of audiences. As a result, formal 
accountability relationships are hardly indicative of how actual dynamics are likely 
to play out. Instead, these dynamics are contingent on the perceptions of external 
audiences and the significance of the relationship for the account-holder and -giver. 
Formal provisions tell us little about how the actual relationships will work out; 
however, they will provide for resources for the parties involved. Third, it offers a 
number of predictions as to how relationship dynamics between account-holder and 
account-giver will evolve, given their respective reputational investment. It suggests 
how different constellations lead to different behavioral patterns and overall 
outcomes in terms of accountability relationships. In other words, this article 
suggests that any analysis of accountability should start with the relational 
implications regarding reputational investment before investing into the design of 
institutions of account-holding and -giving.  
 
Another important implication is that a reputational understanding of accountability 
processes suggests there is no “Goldilocks state” of accountability. The seemingly 
ideal state of "high interest” among both account-giver and account-holder, where 
both parties are invested in the accountability relationship, is exactly the kind of 
“cause and cure” dynamic that has been diagnosed by Dubnick. The end-result of 
such a state of high intensity is the inevitable resource depletion by both 
organizational actors. For instance, if such a state were to characterize a regulatory 
agency’s interactions with all of its account-holders (ranging from audit bodies to 
ombudsmen, to political and social actors etc.), it is highly likely that this would 
result in the envisaged accountability pathologies and multiple accountabilities 
disorders identified in the literature. Deficits will particularly occur when “what 
matters” for organizations (be they account-holders and account-givers), and what is 
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therefore prioritized, is not aligned with "what matters” from a public interest 
perspective. The challenge arises from how to align the two in order to harness 
reputational processes to achieve desired accountability outcomes.  
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Table 1 Accountability Relationships 
  ACCOUNT-HOLDER 
 
Reputational 
Investment 
 
High/Core 
 
Low/Non-core 
ACCOUNT-
GIVER 
 
High/Core 
Intensive Heat  Unsolicited Advances 
 
Low/Non-Core 
Going Through the 
Motions 
Parallel Lives 
 
 
